On June 12, 2025, the U.S. and Israel carried out “Operation Midnight Hammer” and coordinated joint strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. American B-2 stealth bomber jets dropped Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) on Fordow and Natanz with the intention of penetrating the underground nuclear facilities. A U.S. Navy submarine launched Tomahawks and subsonic cruise missiles on Isfahan because U.S. intelligence knew they could not sufficiently penetrate its underground facilities.
A wide array of evidence indicates the damage to the Iranian nuclear facilities created short-term bottlenecks but did not permanently destroy the nuclear program.
A leaked internal Defense Intelligence Agency assessment stated the Iranian nuclear program suffered a multi-month setback and the strikes left the underground enrichment halls largely untouched. It claims the strikes did not reach or meaningfully impact the buried halls, especially at Fordow and Isfahan, to deal the sort of damage that could create a long-term setback for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. However, CIA Director John Ratcliffe concluded that the strikes did significant damage and cautioned against “overinterpreting” this intelligence report. He claims there is “new intelligence from an historically reliable” source that key Iranian nuclear facilities were destroyed and “would have to be rebuilt over the course of years.”
Satellite imagery taken days before the strike indicates it was moved elsewhere to a covert location. Vice President JD Vance stated on June 24 that Iran likely retains possession of its 400 kg stockpile of 60% enriched uranium — enough for up to nine to ten nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapons-grade.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, an independent and bipartisan foreign policy think tank, claims in their new report that Natanz sustained major surface damage, but its deeply buried enrichment halls remain structurally intact. At Fordow, there is no confirmed degradation of the facility’s subterranean centrifuge cascades. At Isfahan, activity at the site remains limited, indicating an operational halt.
On Sept. 13, Le Monde, a French newspaper, reported that Israeli intelligence admitted in private discussions with French authorities that the strikes did not destroy Tehran’s nuclear program. According to their sources familiar with the conversations, despite some facilities being destroyed, “Iran still possesses this type of equipment” and “it’s only a matter of time” before the program restarts. The strikes extended beyond nuclear facilities, as Israeli officials reported the death of 14 senior Iranian nuclear scientists.
Historical evidence suggests these assassinations can be a useful impediment but lack long-term effectiveness. In 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the chief scientist of the Iranian nuclear program, was assassinated, allegedly by the Israeli government, which was considered a massive blow to the program. However, experts explained that Iran retained the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to continue enrichment and weapons-related research. As early as 2021, independent analysts citing IAEA reports calculated that Iran’s breakout time could have fallen to around one to three months depending on scenarios.
Since U.S. assessments concluded Iran halted its structured weapons program in 2003, Tehran has pursued a strategy of nuclear latency: expanding enrichment and research under the banner of civilian use while stopping short of an overt bomb program. This approach preserves the option of rapid weaponization without incurring the immediate costs of becoming an international pariah.
U.S. intelligence assessments, reiterated as late as March 2025 by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, concluded that Ayatollah Khamenei had not ordered the construction of a nuclear weapon. This stood in stark contrast to Israel’s operational tempo. According to a Washington Post investigation, Netanyahu had already ordered preparations for strikes months earlier, after Israeli forces degraded Hezbollah and dismantled much of Iran’s air defenses in October 2024. Mossad drew up assassination lists of nuclear scientists, and the Israeli Air Force began systematically targeting air defenses across Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq to clear the skies for an eventual campaign. The Post reported that when Israel finally attacked in June 2025, the decision was not driven by fresh intelligence of an imminent Iranian bomb but by a strategic opportunity to damage a weakened adversary.
In effect, the claim of an imminent Iranian bomb functioned as a façade; the strikes were the product of years of planning and reflected a broader geopolitical calculus to exploit Iran’s moment of weakness rather than a response to new intelligence.
Netanyahu himself admitted this in leaked transcripts of senior Israeli military deliberations, aired by Channel 13 and reported in the Times of Israel. On June 12, 2025, he told his security cabinet that Iran might obtain nuclear explosives ‘within a few years,’ even as he publicly warned they were only months away. The Times also reports that a senior IDF official conceded that ‘at the end of the operation, Iran will still possess enriched material,’ describing the real aim as creating harsher long-term conditions to prevent Tehran from nuclearizing and to improve Israel’s strategic balance.
Analysis:
I contend that these strikes have created a strategic vacuum of instability that, ironically, might make a nuclear Iran more likely and invite China to increase their current support of Iran and involvement in MENA writ large.
Midnight Hammer may have shattered the doctrine of strategic ambiguity that has constrained the mullahs for decades. By the early 2020s, analysts estimated Iran’s breakout to weapons-grade material could be measured in weeks, though full weaponization would take longer. Iran’s Amad Plan pursued structured weaponization until 2003, after which the program shifted to dispersal and hedging strategies. They continued research and nuclear development after this halt and were likely unable to truly build the bomb until recently.
But they did not. Khamenei seemed to have not authorized a nuclear breakout because this position of ‘we could have it, but we’re not building it, but we still could!’ has significant strategic benefits.
Iran gets the deterrence and power projection of a nuke because of the hypothetical, but not the international sanctions and pariah status of the reality. This arrangement forced a quasi-security guarantee between the U.S., Iran, and Israel. If they do not build the weapon, they will not be struck, but if they build it, they will. However, Midnight Hammer blew up this fragile equilibrium.
Tehran learned that restraint no longer buys immunity. The argument that hardliners inside the regime have been pushing for years that only a real nuclear weapon deters the Israelis and Americans only looks more prescient and logical. Iran now has a strong geopolitical justification to abandon the threshold doctrine and new political capital to do so. Why would Iran cooperate when refraining from building the bomb earned them bunker-busters, assassinations and widespread civilian death?
India spent decades in nuclear ambiguity after its 1974 test, effectively living at the threshold until it chose to go overt with the 1998 Pokhran-II series. That decision was driven by regional competition with Pakistan and China, and by the desire to formalize its nuclear status. North Korea followed a different path: after decades of confrontation with the United States and South Korea, Pyongyang concluded that only a nuclear arsenal could guarantee regime survival against the threat of U.S.-backed invasion or forced regime change. Its nuclear “trump card” has not lifted sanctions but has compelled Washington, Seoul, and Beijing to treat the regime as a permanent nuclear-armed actor, opening the door to high-level negotiations and limited concessions it could never have extracted otherwise.
Weaker states, out of pure self-interest, battle asymmetric conflicts by “symmetrizing” them with nukes. I fear that Operation Midnight Hammer might have made this possibility with Iran more likely, especially considering how short-term the setbacks of the operation seem to be. However, the long-term forecast of the Iranian nuclear program is still unclear. We must avoid projecting excess certainty on the situation.
Iran has bluffed about withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before. The regime does not want to deal with the consequences of violating it, including renewed multilateral sanctions, global isolation and restrictions on oil experts, especially amidst domestic instability.
As of Sept. 18, 2025, Iran is six days away from the U.N. reimposing significant sanctions through the snapback mechanism initiated by France, the U.K. and Germany. Iran must agree to resume cooperation with the IAEA, answer questions about its enriched uranium stockpiles and respect nuclear oversight obligations, or face renewed international sanctions.
The most consequential is a renewed U.N. ban on Iranian oil exports, cutting Tehran’s chief revenue lifeline. The EU will freeze Iran’s central bank assets and reinstate the arms embargo. This would squeeze an already struggling Tehran but also create an opening for China. Beijing has already been buying over 90% of Iranian oil exports in the last few years. A total snapback would deepen Tehran’s reliance on Chinese markets and financing in all sectors of its economy. Iranian suppliers have already begun reducing oil prices for China to account for international pressure.
Historically, Beijing has walked a fine line in the Middle East by investing in both Saudi Arabia and Iran. But after brokering the 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization to secure Gulf oil flows, the balancing act is no longer necessary. China can afford to lean toward Tehran without losing Riyadh.
These new dynamics and international sanctions spurred by Midnight Hammer may lead to the emergence of a new junior partner for China in the Middle East. Iran’s air defenses have been eviscerated by Israeli military campaigns and China’s HQ-9 SAMs and Chengdu J-10 jets are exactly what they need. Not only can they rely on China for oil, but also aerial deterrence against Israeli and U.S. strikes.
If Beijing provides them, or ramps up arms sales, Tehran’s calculus may shift. The cost of preventive airstrikes for the U.S. and Israel rises and there is more breathing space for Tehran to pursue nuclear development. Even a modest boost in air defense could embolden Tehran to shoulder more risk. This is an insecure state that might be willing to take a nuclear risk — or at least a more aggressive posture.
As Foreign Affairs puts it, “The scaffolding that had preserved Iran’s security for the last two decades has collapsed.” If a Taiwan crisis erupts, Iran could threaten Gulf shipping or energy chokepoints, splitting U.S. naval deployments. China gets a proxy pressure valve against U.S. naval dominance, while Iran gets a shield from total isolation. The old bargain of ambiguity and restraint in exchange for limited strikes and sanctions is gone. Midnight Hammer created a strategic vacuum with a China-sized hole in it, which can shape Middle Eastern politics and the broader U.S.-China contest for years to come.
